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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3828
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

Chief of Station, Vienna

Chief, IS

Info: Cell, Munich
Att: ASB

Operational/SECURITY

Suggestions for reorganization of War Assets

Synopsis:

A review of HUBER's wartime assets and their future handling has become necessary. The most immediate reason for this is the imminent departure from the Austrian Division of the two case officers who have been principally concerned with spotting, recruiting, and training of such wartime assets. We recommend that the following five steps be taken:

- a. Review the present wartime assets and drop those which have not lived up to our expectations.
- b. Utilize the services of three part-time agent handlers to continue to contact and train our singleton agents.
- c. Recontact and give refresher training to all (FI and SI) A/T operators on a regular basis.
- d. Continue contact to CHLUBER 1 and his "organization," but emphasize to him the need for establishing means for HUBER to contact additional personnel in his organization in case of war.
- e. Continue contact to CHLUBER 2, directing him to recruit and prepare FI and SI soldiers in areas in which HUBER is required by U.S. AUSA to establish wartime assets.

End of Synopsis

1. Is attached to JMW TEMA [] reviewed Project CHLUBER and made several recommendations for the future handling of this project. He welcome this review and urge that the reassessment of Project CHLUBER be made the first part of a general review of HUBER's wartime

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situation in Austria. The need for such an overall review becomes apparent when we face the fact that the Austrian Mission will in all probability be able to assign only one full time staff employee to organize, supervise, and handle all of KUBARK's wartime assets in Austria. We believe that some changes in our established policy general may be necessary, and we are submitting our ideas for your comments.

2. Our ideas are predicated on the following propositions:

a. KUBARK will continue to be shouldered by G.S. KUBARK with the responsibility for establishing assets in Austria which can be activated in time of war.

b. The Austrian Mission desires to maintain KUBARK's equity in the majority of assets which have already been contacted or trained by our staff officers.

c. The Austrian Mission will be able to assign only one full-time staff employee to carry out the tasks described above.

d. It is unrealistic to maintain an artificial distinction between so-called P and PI assets in the G/T field.

3. In NSM 1979 (19 March 1946) the KUBARK G/T requirements, as they pertain to Austria, were outlined in somewhat detail. We have good reason to believe that these requirements will not change radically in the coming years. Fortunately, we are able to meet at least the minimum of most of these requirements with our present assets. The KUBARK "war assets" we have been talking about until now are those KUBARK agents who have been contacted and trained to be "responsive to U.S. influences for use in support of U.S. military objectives" (see paragraph 3 of NSM 1979). Partially because of this definition, we have not included the paramilitary assets of GINSENG in this discussion and review.

4. Without the GINSENG assets (they will continue to be assets responsive to GINSENG 1 rather than to the U.S.), KUBARK has available the following intelligence personnel recruited for wartime use:

A. G/T Assets

CHALMERS 2
CHALMERS 3
CHALMERS 4
CHALMERS
CHALMERS
CHALMERS 1

B. Agents Designated Paramilitary

CHALMERS 1
CHALMERS 2

C. Agents Formerly Designated G & T; Now, GINSENG

CHALMERS 3
CHALMERS 4
CHALMERS 5
CHALMERS 6
CHALMERS 7
CHALMERS 8
CHALMERS 9

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B.
SECRET 6
CONTINUED

C.
SECRET 21
SECRET 22
SECRET 23
SECRET 1
SECRET 2
SECRET 1 & 2

1. The above listing of agents may not be much to represent ~~SECRET~~ in Austria after the outbreak of war, but it certainly would be a formidable, if not impossible task, for one staff employee to maintain them in possession. It is assumed that it would be worth our while to continue our contact to most of these agents, it will be necessary to devise some system for so doing. We therefore submit the following:

a. Review the singleten agent status, and eliminate those who for some reason have not lived up to our expectations. (SECRET 1 and 2 might still fall under this category.)

b. Retain the use of three part-time agent handlers. We believe that the part-time use of these agent handlers will enable us to maintain adequate control over and even allow for further exploitation of our present singleten stay-behind agents. The agents, formerly called I & 2 agents, have been personally relabelled "singleten agents." This does not mean that we have discarded the idea of trying to set up the framework of an I & 2 net. It does mean that these agents should be looked upon and should be given orientation in accordance with the definition of "our agents" described in paragraph 1 above. By "part-time agent handlers" we mean an agent who performs principal agent tasks under the direction of [] after having received prior training by the latter. We feel confident that three such part-time agent handlers can be found and recommend that, if possible, one should be located in Innsbruck, one in Salzburg, and one in Vienna. The P/A living in Innsbruck could handle SECRET 1, 21, 22, 23, and 24. The P/A living in Salzburg could handle SECRET 1 and 2, SECRET 1 and 2, and SECRET 1. The P/A living in Vienna could handle SECRET 1, 1, 2, 3, and 4. Since all stay-behinds should receive more or less the same type of training and since they are not confidential cases, it would be sufficient if they are contacted once every two months while undergoing training and debriefing and less frequently thereafter. Our Innsbruck candidate for such a P/A job would be SECRET 1, who was granted a P/A as of May 1946 per eff 13537. We submit that the Vienna P/A job could be performed by one of the junior case officers living under deep cover in Vienna, and the Salzburg P/A job could possibly even be performed by SECRET 1. It would, of course, be preferable if the Salzburg P/A would also be an American citizen.

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4. Propose to give refresher training to all W/T agents. The night W/T operators trained in special techniques are equipped with radio sets and plans which should enable them to contact KGB. These are probably our most valuable wartime agents in Austria. We therefore recommend strongly that these agents be contacted at least twice a year and that arrangements be made for them to receive refresher W/T training once a year. We feel that it is an arbitrary decision to consider some W/T operators as IV agents and some as VI agents. We therefore recommend that one case officer (our choice would be [redacted]) be charged with the responsibility of seeing to it that refresher training be given to all our W/T operators. By such responsibility we mean that this case officer make the necessary arrangements at VSB and with KGB, Frankfurt, for arranging their training. We do not, however, propose that this case officer be made to contact these agents himself. We feel that it would be feasible for one of our case officers to contact these W/T agents and in one meeting with them establish when they can take their training and in a second meeting instruct them where to go for such training. The actual training of the agents would be done by KGB personnel of the German Section. We would do well to pay such agents a worthwhile salary; for example, \$200 or \$300 a year plus travel expenses and per diem while they are in training in order to secure us of their continued cooperation. We believe that such an arrangement would not place too great a strain on the station.

5. Continuation of contact to the GELBEN "Organization." We agree with the views expressed by [redacted] in attachment to this report that our policy vis-a-vis the GELBEN Project needs clarification. We furthermore agree with his view that we should discontinue to look upon GELBEN as a paramilitary organization. We feel that a more realistic program for GELBEN would be to continue contact with GELBEN 1 as a principal agent and continue the training program with him, which has already been started by [redacted]. We recommend that GELBEN 1 be requested to impart this knowledge to his trusted lieutenants, GELBEN 2, 3, 4/1, and 4/2. We furthermore recommend that it be made clear to GELBEN 1 that it is of the utmost importance to KGB to be able to contact reliable persons in wartime. It should be pointed out to him that U.S. aid to his "organization" can come only through leads brought in from the outside. It should be obvious to him that such leads need contact points and that we must have prior information on such contact points. For this we need biographical data now in order to clear them for such an eventuality. Through this device it might be possible to obtain the data on members of the "organization" which will enable us to contact them at some time when this becomes necessary. We definitely do not believe that we should rely to any extent on the GELBEN "organization" in wartime, and we therefore do not recommend any standing plan for GELBEN 1. We do not necessarily agree with [redacted] suggestion (see paragraph 12 of attachment to this report)

that GRABOWSKI I and finally be evacuated to a HIDEOUT near Bern and recommend that no such promise of assistance be made at this time. Our objection is based mainly on our belief that GRABOWSKI I does not have the qualities necessary to become an exile war-leader for an eventual Austrian underground. If GRABOWSKI I realizes that he will have to remain in Austria in time of war, he will in all probability make a greater effort to establish means of communications which will enable HIDEOUT or U.S. troops to come to the aid of the Austrian underground movement which he plans to head.

Summary:

We hope that the above ideas are of some help to you in reformulating or regrouping our wartime assets. We realize that a review of all wartime assets places a great strain on the station, but we believe that this would be a one-time effort which in the long run will pay off. Our ISBERG W/T agents, as well as our other W/T agents, require refresher training regularly. SORELL has already indicated its willingness to give such training (see 100-7111) dated 21 June 1956). We realize full well that the mere arranging for such training (i.e., the contacting of the agent to find out whether and when he can take such training) takes case officers' time, but we have accepted the requirements levied upon us by HUCON and should try to carry them out. We realize that our suggestions regarding the future conduct vis-a-vis the GRABOWSKI operation do not contain any original propositions. We should continue to stress to GRABOWSKI I the need for letting us have further insight into the details of his "organization." It might be pointed out to him that the support which his "organization" deserves in time of war might otherwise go to other groups who have granted us greater confidence. If a scheme similar to the one suggested above could be instituted, we would be able to keep up all our major wartime assets while at the same time giving one or more of our deep cover junior case officers experience in contacting and training relatively complicated agents. Under the above outline system it might even be possible for HUC to continue handling the contact to GRABOWSKI and GRABOWSKI.

5 August 1956

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